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Plain facts about pleading: How to work with rule 166 
If facts to support conclusions of law or other allegations are not adequately pleaded, UCPR 
rule 166 is unlikely to help. Report by Sheryl Jackson. 
Pleadings – denials and non-admissions under the UCPR – allegations involving 
conclusions of law – allegations of mixed fact and law – application of philosophy of UCPR 
in r5 
The decision of Durward SC DCJ in OSM Group Pty Ltd v Holden [2013] QDC 151 involves a 
useful consideration of the requirements relating to the pleading of denials and non-
admissions under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR). 
In particular, the decision examines the extent of the obligations when pleading in response 
to allegations of law, or of mixed fact and law. 
Facts 
The proceeding arose from an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant in 
relation to the operations of OSM Innovative Training Solutions (ITS). The plaintiff asserted 
that there was an express agreement between it and the defendant relating to the 
defendant’s responsibility for the day-to-day operations of ITS and the way he would be 
remunerated. The plaintiff also relied on implied terms of the agreement and fiduciary 
duties alleged to have arisen because of the relationship between the parties. 
The plaintiff pleaded that by specific conduct the defendant demonstrated an intention not 
to be bound by the agreement and in that way repudiated the agreement. The plaintiff also 
pleaded that it accepted the repudiation and terminated the agreement. It was further 
asserted that the defendant, in breach of a number of both express and implied terms and 
fiduciary duties, had caused the plaintiff loss and damage. 
In his defence to the statement of claim, the defendant made various express admissions. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defence also contained denials and non-admissions that 
amounted to deemed admissions under r166 of the UCPR. The plaintiff adopted the express 
admissions in its reply. It also pleaded the basis on which it characterised the various denials 
and non-admissions as amounting to deemed admissions, and adopted the alleged deemed 
admissions. 
The plaintiff applied for summary judgment under r190 of the UCPR on the basis of deemed 
admissions in the defence. In the alternative it sought judgment under r292 of the UCPR on 
the grounds that the defence did not establish a real prospect of success at trial. 
Denials and non-admissions under the UCPR 
Rule 166 UCPR provides: 
 
166  Denials and non-admissions  
(1) an allegation of fact made by a party in a pleading is taken to be admitted by an 
opposite party required to plead to the pleading unless – 
(a) the allegation is denied or stated to be not admitted by the opposite party 
in a pleading; or 
(b) rule 168 applies. 
(3) a party may plead a non-admission only if – 
(a) the party has made enquiries to find out whether the allegation is true or 
untrue; and 
(b) the inquiries for an allegation are reasonable having regard to the time 
limited for filing and serving the defence or other pleading in which the 
denial or non-admission of the allegation is contained; and 
(c) the party remains uncertain as to the truth or falsity of the allegation. 
(4) a party’s denial or non-admission of an allegation of fact must be accompanied by 
direct explanation for the party’s belief that the allegation is untrue or cannot be 
admitted.  
(5) If a party’s denial or non-admission of an allegation does not comply with sub-
rule (4), the party is taken to have admitted the allegation. 
 
Submissions on disputed pleadings 
The plaintiff submitted various paragraphs of the amended statement of claim were 
properly characterised as allegations of material facts. Accordingly, deemed admissions 
resulted under r166(5) where the defendant had made denials with the only explanation 
being that the allegations were untrue, without any direct explanation for that belief, and 
also where the defendant’s non-admissions were not accompanied by an explanation for 
the defendant’s uncertainty as to the fact’s truth or falsity. 
The defendant submitted that the issue of deemed admissions could not arise with respect 
to allegations of law, or of mixed fact and law. It was further submitted that the explanation 
for the denial depends on the nature of the allegation: some disputed allegations were 
pleaded as particulars and were not ‘material facts’. Accordingly there was no requirement 
to plead to them. 
Specific examples of the circumstances which the plaintiff alleged involved a failure by the 
defendant to comply with the requirements of r166 of the UCPR included: 
• In response to the allegation in the amended statement of claim that the agreement 
contained a number of implied terms relating to the defendant’s financial obligations 
and management, or alternatively fiduciary duties owed by him, the defence 
asserted those pleadings were legal conclusions (implied terms) and were “wrong”. 
The defendant submitted that the allegations about financial obligations and 
management were conclusions of law, being implied terms and recitations of 
principle without facts from which implications could be drawn. There were matters 
for the court to determine and not matters for pleading. Similarly it was submitted 
that the allegation that the defendant owed a fiduciary duty was a conclusion of law, 
unsupported by factual allegations other than the vague phrase “in the premises 
above”, and not a matter for pleading. 
• The amended statement of claim referred to an oral request (paragraph 10) and to 
correspondence (paragraphs 15 and 16). The defence asserted that paragraph 10 
was untrue, that paragraph 15 was wrong, and that the repudiation in paragraph 16 
was denied. 
The defendant submitted that its pleading in response to paragraph 10 was 
compliant; that the allegation in paragraph 15 of conduct amounting to a 
repudiation of the agreement was an allegation of law and no deemed admission 
was made; and that the sending of the letter referred to in paragraph 16 was an 
allegation of fact and was admitted, but that the meaning of the terms of the letter – 
breach of express or implied terms – was a matter of law and no deemed admission 
was made. 
In addition to the specific submissions characterising the disputed parts of the pleadings as 
deemed admissions, the plaintiff relief, in a holistic sense, on the philosophy of the UCPR, as 
expressed in r5 (Philosophy – overriding obligations of parties and court). 
Analysis 
Durward SC DCJ referred to several authorities which have expressly considered the 
implications involved in pleading to allegations of mixed fact and law. In that context his 
Honour noted that Dixon J in Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279, at 306, wrote that “a 
statement of a conclusion expressed as fact is ordinarily treated as a statement of fact”. 
In Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins [2003] 215 CLR 317, however, Gummow J said (at [69]-[70]) that 
“a party may admit the facts from which a conclusion of law may then be drawn”, but that: 
“Different questions arise where, as here, the suggested admission includes a conclusion 
which depends upon the application of a legal standard”. His Honour regarded it as 
unsettled whether admissions may be made of matters of mixed law and fact, as distinct 
from it being open for the court to draw a legal conclusion from statements. His Honour had 
referred to a statement in Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 
1 NSWLR 669, at 684, that “A party to litigation may make an admission, not only of a fact, 
but also a conclusion from facts, a mixture of fact and law, or even of law”. 
Reference was also made to Arnold Electrical and Data Installations P/L v Logan Area Group 
Apprenticeship/Traineeship Scheme Ltd [2008] QCA 100. In that case there was an issue 
about whether the ‘construction rate’ or the lower ‘service rate’ was the applicable hire rate 
under a labour supply contract. It was submitted for the defendant that it was entitled to 
rely on a deemed admission under r166 of the UCPR that the service rate was the correct 
rate, on the basis that the plaintiff’s pleaded explanation for its denial of the defendant’s 
allegation in the counterclaim that it overpaid the plaintiff (that it was not true) was 
insufficient. That submission was rejected. Fraser JA, with whom the president and Lyons J 
agreed, emphasised that r166 is concerned with allegations of facts in pleadings. His Honour 
said that the allegation of an overpayment asserted a conclusion based on various matters 
that were not pleaded, and that r166 could not be called in aid of a claimant who fails to 
plead or prove the material facts required to support the claim. 
Durward SC DCJ concluded that the approach of Fraser JA in Arnold as to conclusions of law 
pleaded by the plaintiff should be preferred, even though his Honour was considering 
pleadings in a different context. Durward SC DCJ explained the applicable principles in these 
terms (at [35]): 
“Where allegations of law or conclusions of law are pleaded by the plaintiff, the 
requirement is to plead only to such part of a pleaded paragraph as contains an allegation of 
material fact that is the source of the conclusion. Where there is an allegation of mixed fact 
and law the requirement is the same. Where material facts are pleaded as particulars, there 
is no requirement to plead to them: Ballisteros v Chidlow (No.2) [2005] QSC 285 at [21]. 
However, particulars do not stand alone and customarily are pleaded by way of elucidation 
or description and follow a specific allegation of a material fact. Hence a pleading in 
response may, but not necessarily, need to be accompanied by further factual allegations in 
a Defence. Finally, I consider that the issue of whether a term should be implied in an 
agreement is an issue of law. Hence, where implied terms are pleaded there is no 
requirement to plead specifically to them in the Defence.” 
His Honour then turned to the specific paragraphs that were in dispute to determine 
whether any of them were deemed admissions. Although he did identify some limited 
aspects in which the defence was deficient, he found in each case that there was no 
deemed admission. In some cases this was because a direct explanation had been provided. 
In others it was because the allegations being responded to were not material facts, but 
were implied terms, or to conclusions of law, or were particulars, and it was not necessary 
to plead to them. 
Durward SC DCJ also addressed the plaintiff’s submission in reliance on r5 of the UCPR. His 
Honour acknowledged that the overriding philosophy as expressed in that rule applies 
equally to the pleading process as it does to other aspects of a proceeding. He noted, 
however, that relevant authorities made it clear that the pleading rules are designed to 
ensure “early comprehensive disclosure of the case to be mounted by the plaintiff, and the 
response of the defence” (Robinson v Laws [2003] 1 Qd R 81 at [52]) and also that the rules 
are meant to limit disputes to issues that are genuinely in contest, but not to prevent the 
trial of issues that are genuinely in dispute (Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Davey 
[2010] QCA 246). 
In light of his conclusions about the specific paragraphs of the pleadings in dispute, his 
Honour was satisfied that the defence was substantially responsive and that there was 
plainly a genuine dispute that required a trial. 
Conclusion 
Durward SC DCJ concluded that the plaintiff had not established an entitlement to judgment 
under r190 of the UCPR (Admissions) on the basis of deemed admissions. His Honour also 
declined to order summary judgment under r292 of the UCPR (Summary judgment for 
plaintiff) on the basis that he was satisfied that the defendant had a real prospect of 
success. 
The application was dismissed, but leave was granted to the defendant to file and serve and 
amended defence within 14 days of the date of delivery of the judgment, addressing the 
aspects in the defence had been found deficient. Costs were reserved for trial. 
Comment 
Rule 166 of the UCPR serves a valuable role in assisting to ensure that a party pleads in a 
way that is responsive and narrows the issues in dispute between the parties. 
Parties must, however, comply with the fundamental obligation under r149 of the UCPR 
(Statements in pleadings) to plead all the material facts on which the party relies. As this 
case highlights, r166 will not assist a party who has not adequately pleaded facts to support 
conclusions of law or other allegations in a statement of claim or counterclaim. 
 
 
